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REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND HEDGE FUND
REGULATION: THE NEED FOR A
TRANSNATIONAL RESPONSE
Hossein Nabilou*
Regulatory arbitrage is an indispensable element of regulatory
competition as it provides regulatory substitutes for firms, and allows
those firms to optimally benefit from such competition. This also
increases the elasticity of demand for regulators and engenders
accountability among them. Hedge funds, as paragons of exploiting
regulatory discrepancies, are heavily criticized for thwarting efforts to
address systemic risk. This Article investigates the arbitrage-seeking
behavior of hedge funds in a globally-fragmented financial regulatory
framework.
Despite its benefits, regulatory arbitrage involves certain costs.
Although market discipline can constrain these negative externalities,
due to certain idiosyncratic features of the hedge fund industry, such
as the sophistication of investor base, operational mobility, higher
attrition rate, and lack of transparency, market discipline by itself
cannot fully limit the potential externalities of regulatory arbitrage by
hedge funds. These features weaken market signals and reduce the
reputational benefits of being subject to greater regulatory oversight.
The lower reputational costs and broad private investor exemptions in
turn reduce the overall costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds in
comparison to other financial services providers and mainstream
financial institutions, and make it more likely for hedge funds to
engage in regulatory arbitrage.
In a departure from mainstream research, which recommends
regulatory coordination, cooperation, harmonization, and
consolidation as legal remedies to address problems originating from
regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, this Article argues that such
proposals are at best misguided and at worst systemic risk amplifiers.
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Instead, this Article suggests that to reduce the likelihood of
regulatory arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the
strategies for regulation should focus on indirect regulation of the
funds through their counterparties, creditors, and investors for whom
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage tend to be significantly high.
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INTRODUCTION
In regulation of economic activities, the alternatives are no longer
between the two polar extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and
government-central planning.1 The complexity of the modern financial

1. SANFORD IKEDA, DYNAMICS OF THE MIXED ECONOMY: TOWARD A THEORY OF
INTERVENTIONISM (2003).
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system offers no viable solution other than a mixed economy within
which private enterprises and the government must cooperate in order to
shape economic incentives meaningfully. One of the challenging
problems arising from having a mixed economy in place is determining
where to draw the line between regulated markets and unregulated
markets, and between lightly-regulated and heavily-regulated markets.2
The discussion around hedge funds cannot be separated from their
traditional development as private investment companies that have been
granted special exemptions by regulatory systems due to their private
status and high tolerance for risk.
In addition, the globalization of financial markets poses serious
challenges to regulatory regimes and their responses to address potential
systemic effects of investment funds. Hedge funds are one of the global
players of the investment world. However, their regulatory framework
remains local. The cross-border reach of the modern trading infrastructure
and the existing patchwork of financial regulatory regimes enables
circumvention of the specific mandates of individual regimes in a
globally-fragmented financial regulatory system. The regulatory arbitrage
opportunities arising in this fragmented regulatory framework coupled
with economic firms’ desire to maximize their profits by reducing their
regulatory costs incentivize exploitation of discrepancies. Hence,
fragmented regulatory systems not only lead to the comingling of
regulated economic activities with unregulated ones,3 but also result in
regulatory arbitrage.
Regulatory arbitrage has as long a history as regulation itself and is
as ubiquitous as economic regulation. The first instances of regulatory

2. See generally Charles Goodhart, The Boundary Problem in Financial
Regulation, 206 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 48 (2008).
3. James W. McKie, Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of Boundaries,
1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 66 (1970).
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arbitrage are documented in the context of medical ethics4 and taxation.5
In financial markets, the well-known example of religious prohibitions on
interest sparked huge regulatory arbitrage activities. The advent of
instruments such as murabaha transactions and ijara wa iqtina (leasing
and promise to gift) in Islamic finance,6 and of mechanisms such as dry
exchanges (cambio secco) and discretionary deposits7 was to circumvent
the ban on riba8 in Islamic finance and interest in Christianity.9 Regulatory
4. Durant reports about the widespread presence of tax evasion in ancient Greece.
WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE: THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION, VOL. 2 (2011). The
great lawgiver of ancient Athens, Solon, was criticized on the account that the strong and
the clever could escape his laws by twisting those laws to their advantage. Id. It is also
well-documented that the Hippocratic code of medical ethics regarding abortion was
systematically circumvented by physicians outsourcing the practice to midwives. Id. The
modern equivalence of midwives in finance are the special purpose vehicles (SPVs)
designed to enjoy the exceptions from certain bankruptcy requirements (bankruptcyproof financing).
5. Not so far from Greece, Bartlett illustrates how differential tax treatment of
citizens (especially small landowners) and slaves in the Roman Empire induced
regulatory arbitrage. Bruce Bartlett, How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome,
14 CATO J. 287, 300–01 (1994). Since landowner citizens were heavily taxed and slaves
were tax exempt, the citizens used to change their civil status from citizen to slave to
avoid excessive taxation. Id. He notes how, despite increases in tax rates, the tax revenues
decreased, which in turn contributed to the further decline of the Roman Empire. Id.
6. Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early
History of Regulatory Arbitrage, 87 OR. L. REV. 93, 103-04 (2008). It is also argued that
most Islamic finance instruments were invented to circumvent the restrictions that Sharia
law places on riba (interest) and gharar (excessive uncertainty) in financial contracts.
See MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE
(2006).
7. See generally TIM PARKS, MEDICI MONEY: BANKING, METAPHYSICS AND ART IN
FIFTEENTH-CENTURY FLORENCE (2013).
8. In Islamic finance, it is believed riba is different from interest. See generally
ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JAZIRI, AL-FIQH ‘ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-ARBA’AH (1986); TIMUR
KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK THE MIDDLE EAST
(2011).
9. Ferguson demonstrates how Jews dominated the financial markets of medieval
Europe by interpreting the Bible in a certain way to circumvent its ban on interest. See
NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011). Kuran illustrates how
indigenous Christians and Jews of the Middle East dominated the most profitable
economic sectors in the region, especially in banking and insurance, through the choice
of law. Timur Kuran, Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical
Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2004). Such a
freedom to choose to be subject to their own laws enabled them to escape the restrictions
posed by Islamic economic institutions while Muslims themselves lacked such an option.
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arbitrage reached its zenith in the globalization and information age.10 In
modern times, the globalization of trade and finance gave traders more
informational advantages. Coupled with the absence of global
coordination, such a trend amplified the likelihood, magnitude, and
frequency of regulatory arbitrage.11
A hedge fund can be defined as a privately organized investment
vehicle “with a specific fee structure not widely available to the public,
aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements
(alpha)12 through active trading and other strategies.”13 Hedge funds are
Id. Indeed, it was impossible for Muslims to convert (punishable by death sentence) to
another religion (restructure the business entity) and take advantage of other regulatory
jurisdictions. Id. However, such a reorganization or change in civil status was allowed in
the Roman Empire. Id.
10. Indeed, globalization decreased regulators’ power by harnessing more regulatory
arbitrage opportunities for firms that did not prefer the regulatory policies of their
jurisdiction. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1357 (2003).
11. More recently, it was argued that regulatory arbitrage was one of the main
reasons for the fall of the Glass-Steagall wall in 1999. Viral V. Acharya, Paul Wachtel &
Ingo Walter, International Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 368 (Viral V. Acharya &
Matthew Richardson eds., 2009). In China, since there have been strict restrictions on
lending within the country (China’s benchmark interest rate being 6%, while the same
rate in Hong Kong being 0.5%), Chinese companies use trade finance instruments to
borrow money offshore at much lower interest rates. See Wei Shen, Competing for
Renminbi: Financial Centers in the Context of Renminbi Globalization, in
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 198, 198-99 (Ross P.
Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas & Douglas W. Arner eds., 2016). The regulatory arbitrage
activities are not limited to the prohibitions or caps on interest rates; it would happen in
any other context. For example, the recent tightening and enforcement actions against
banking secrecy laws might result in the rise of organizations offering alternative
unreported channels for funds. Such restrictions on banking might even create incentives
for firms to relocate the deposits to the least compliant bank havens.. See Ruth PlatoShinar,
Cross-Border
Banking:
Reconceptualising
Bank
Secrecy,
in
RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION 249 (2014); see also Niels
Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G-20
Tax Haven Crackdown, 6 AM. ECON. J. 65, 65 (2014).
12. The alpha measures the excess return of a fund relative to a benchmark index.
Simply put, the alpha shows by how much a hedge fund outperforms the markets, which
can serve as a measurement of managerial skill. See William A. Roach Jr., Hedge Fund
Regulation: “What Side of the Hedges Are You on?”, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 166 (2009)
(arguing that generation of returns is one of the significant features of hedge funds).
13. For a definition of hedge funds, see Hossein Nabilou, The Conundrum of Hedge
Fund Definition, 14 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 149 (2017).
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historically viewed as paragons of exploiting regulatory discrepancies.
Moreover, the recent global financial crisis triggered a debate about their
contribution to the event. Thus far, there is plenty of literature on the
potential systemic externalities of hedge funds. The debate about hedge
funds and their role in the financial crisis easily lent itself to political
abuse on both sides of the Atlantic.14 Although different explanations are
presented for such an unprecedented regulatory animosity towards hedge
funds,15 the post-crisis anti-hedge fund sentiment can partly be understood
against a background of hedge funds gaming regulatory regimes by
engaging in regulatory arbitrage.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines and analyzes the
concept and dynamics of regulatory arbitrage. Part II explains regulatory
arbitrage in the context of regulatory competition, and discusses its
virtues—in terms of delivering the benefits of regulatory competition—
and its social costs (or negative externalities). Part III elucidates the role
of market discipline and government regulation in reducing the social
costs of regulatory arbitrage, and evaluates the reasons for the failure of
market mechanisms to address the social costs of regulatory arbitrage by
hedge funds. Part IV discusses the role of public policy responses in
constraining the negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage and
highlights the role of indirect regulation in addressing such problems.
Finally, the Article concludes by noting that indirect regulation can better
address the potential externalities of regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds.
I. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: CONCEPT AND DYNAMICS
Arbitrage is “the exploitation of a price difference between two
goods that are essentially the same.”16 Arbitrage often takes place where

14. Politicians demonized hedge funds as being “crazy” and “hellish” which “fall
like a plague of locusts over [the] companies, devour everything, then fly on to the next
one.” Sebastian Mallaby, Hands off Hedge Funds, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 91, 92 (2007)
(quoting Franz Müntefering, Germany’s former deputy chancellor); Lex Column, The
Italian Locust, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 16, 2008.
15. Romano argues that such a move toward regulating hedge funds is
understandable in the traditional wariness toward short-selling activities. See Roberta
Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment (Yale L. & Econ.
Research Paper No. 414, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=16
97348 [https://perma.cc/SRJ9-7MK6].
16. Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 329, 357 (2010).
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the prices of identical goods are different in two markets. In addition to
the price differentials stemming from market inefficiencies, some of these
differences arise from different regulatory schemes. To understand
regulatory arbitrage, regulatory requirements should be viewed as the
price of conducting certain business activities in a particular jurisdiction.
In this context, differential regulatory treatment of homogenous activities
in different jurisdictions imposes differential costs on identical economic
activities. Accordingly, the goods and services produced within two
different jurisdictions will have different fixed costs. This difference in
fixed costs will affect the price of final products and services.
A firm, which is free to choose between two jurisdictions with
differential regulatory costs will engage in business at lower regulatory
costs.17 Therefore, regulatory arbitrage, broadly defined, refers to shifting
activities from a heavily regulated financial sector to an unregulated or
lightly regulated financial sector with the aim of maximizing profits by
taking advantage of regulatory differentials. In essence, “regulatory
arbitrage exploits the gap between the economic substance of a
transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.”18
Regulatory arbitrage can also be seen as an unintended consequence
of effective regulation. Effective regulation is costly and “is likely to
penalize those within the regulated sector, relative to those just outside,
causing substitution flows towards the unregulated.”19 Firms engaged in
regulatory arbitrage often do so to avoid taxes, strict accounting
standards, disclosure requirements, and regulatory burdens.20 Although
there are different mechanisms to engage in regulatory arbitrage, the most
popular and apparently the least costly mechanism involves restructuring
a deal.21 For instance, most financial derivatives were designed to take
advantage of arbitrage opportunities.22 Derivatives and strategies
exploiting such market discrepancies enable market participants to avoid
financial regulations and tax burdens.23

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229.
Goodhart, supra note 2, at 48.
Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Lynn A. Stout, Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of
Uncertainty Can Increase Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L.
53, 57 (1995).
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Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage may arise within one single
jurisdiction or between two or more jurisdictions. “Intra-jurisdiction
regulatory arbitrage”24 arises where one jurisdiction treats some financial
activities differently from other similar activities, thereby subjecting the
same financial activities or methods to governance under different rules.
In the presence of such differential regulation, if there are two methods of
achieving the same outcome within one jurisdiction and one method costs
less than the other, ceteris paribus, a profit-maximizing firm will choose
the method involving lower costs either by restructuring its legal entity
(institutional engineering) or by shifting the business activities towards
the lower cost method using legal and financial engineering. The latter
form is achieved either by specifically tailoring the features of a financial
product or by choosing the markets in which trades will take place.
Needless to say, both methods involve legal and financial engineering,
which mainly involve the use of derivatives.
It is well-acknowledged that one of the driving forces behind
financial innovation has been financial regulation.25 Indeed, some
financial innovations are “designed to keep regulators in the dark.”26
Financial regulation follows the logic and dynamics of influence and
change in the behavior of regulated industries. From this perspective,
most financial innovations were strategic responses to regulations.
Financial institutions have created an array of innovative derivative
instruments to circumvent regulation or decrease the costs of compliance.
For example, Gorton and Metrick identify regulatory changes as one of
the major factors giving rise to shadow banks, the other being private
innovation.27 In their work, the rise of shadow banking is mainly
attributed to the regulatory developments within the past four decades that
benefited certain categories of financial institutions and instruments to the
detriment of their close substitutes. The main beneficiaries of these
regulatory changes were money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”)
substituting bank deposits, securitization used for off-balance-sheet
24. It seems that what Charles Goodhart dubs a “boundary problem” is the same as
intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage. See Goodhart, supra note 2.
25. Merton Miller, Financial Innovation: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 459 (1986); see also Frank Partnoy, Financial
Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1996).
26. Jean Tirole, Lessons from the Crisis, in BALANCING THE BANKS: GLOBAL
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 29 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2010).
27. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 269.

2017]

REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND
HEDGE FUND REGULATION

565

financing, and repurchase agreements (“repos”) which made it possible
to use securitized bonds as money.28
Needless to say, not only does shadow banking include MMMFs, but
it also includes hedge funds, private equity funds, proprietary trading
desks of traditional banks and other similar institutions essentially
engaging in maturity transformation.29
On the other hand, “inter-jurisdiction regulatory arbitrage”30 arises
from differential regulatory treatment of identical business activities in
different jurisdictions.31 In this case, absent international financial
coordination, regulatory arbitrage may arise across various national
jurisdictions. The principle of sovereignty in international law, which
entitles states to independently manage their internal economic affairs and
exclude other nation-states from interfering with their domestic affairs, is
the main reason for the differential regulatory treatment of homogenous
activities in different jurisdictions.32 Regardless of its form, regulatory
arbitrage is heavily criticized for neutralizing efforts to address systemic
risks.33

28.
29.

Id. at 261.
See Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Model of Shadow
Banking (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1711, 2011).
30. In Charles Goodhart’s terminology, this would correspond to the “border
problem.” See Charles A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 705, 714-15 (2010).
31. Engert, supra note 16, at 357-58.
32. Such an independent approach to domestic markets came under immense
pressure with rising forces of globalization. In addition to the above considerations for
differential regulatory treatment, the role of exogenous factors should not be overlooked.
Factors, such as lobbying, are a permanent feature of financial regulation. For example,
Partnoy argues that the securities industry itself has played a major role in shaping the
structure of the existing regulation. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the
Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 225 (1997). He attributes the existence
of regulatory exemptions mostly to industry lobbying. See id.
33. For example, Acharya and Richardson believe that regulatory capital arbitrage
was at the heart of the recent financial crisis. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson, Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1, 10 (2012);
see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RISK TAKING,
LIQUIDITY, AND SHADOW BANKING: CURBING EXCESS WHILE PROMOTING GROWTH 89
(2014). In Stein’s view, there are two driving forces behind securitizations: risk-sharing
and regulatory arbitrage. See Jeremy C. Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking &
Financial Fragility, 139 DAEDALUS 41, 45 (2010). The collapse of the securitized
markets in turn played a major role in causing the financial crisis. See id.
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II. CAUSES OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
There are two major causes of regulatory arbitrage. The first is the
differential regulatory treatment of homogenous business activities, and
the second is the ambiguity in the interpretation of the applicable laws.
Differential regulatory treatment arises from financial market
compartmentalization, regulatory competition, and partial industry
regulatory strategies.
A. DIFFERENTIAL REGULATORY TREATMENT OF HOMOGENOUS
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
It is often argued that similar institutions undertaking similar
functions should be regulated similarly.34 Otherwise, regulatory loopholes
may be abused by financial institutions as an unintended consequence of
a regulation that treats identical activities differently, or a regulation that
involves institutional regulation and treats homogenous institutions
heterogeneously. Therefore, the main reason for regulatory arbitrage is
the fragmentation of the regulatory structure throughout the globe and
within a particular jurisdiction.
Regarding the intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, the need for
differentiated regulation creates regulatory bifurcation. Although there
are obvious benefits of subjecting identical firms and financial products
to a single regulator, resulting in better coordination and a level playing
field, unequal and differential treatment of the identical components or
subsets of an industry has its own proponents who advocate for regulatory
competition and underscore its efficiency-enhancing features. Needless to
say, such a system can lead to fragmentation, which can provide potential
opportunities for intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage.35
Differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial activities
has three major explanations: financial market compartmentalization,
which provides the grounds for differential regulatory treatment;36 the
benefits of regulatory competition, which lead to the subjection of
34.
35.
36.

Acharya & Richardson, supra note 33.
Romano, supra note 15, at 19.
In financial markets, institutional financial regulation tends to segment financial
markets and institutions. For example, in most jurisdictions, deposit taking and lending
are regulated activities in which only banks (depository institutions, or credit institutions)
can engage. This by itself can result in market segmentation and can make banks special.
See E. GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1983).
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different firms to governance under different rules;37 and the partial
industry regulation theory, which supports differential regulation to
enhance competition among regulated firms.38 This Article focuses on
regulatory competition and its role in encouraging hedge funds to engage
in regulatory arbitrage.
B. FINANCIAL MARKET COMPARTMENTALIZATION
Financial regulation is a function of the financial system itself, and
regulatory fragmentation is a product of financial market
compartmentalization. Around three decades ago, Corrigan, among
others, argued that banks are special, and hence require special regulatory
treatment. In his view, offering transaction accounts, providing backup
liquidity for all other financial and non-financial institutions, and serving
as a transmission belt for monetary policy were three features that
distinguished banks from other financial and non-financial institutions.39
Almost two decades later, accounting for the development of close
substitutes for banks’ services,40 he repeated the same arguments with
slight differences.41 This “specialness” argument presupposes that even
after accounting for dynamic behavior of different classes of institutions,
the financial services industry can be compartmentalized.42
This argument reasons that the nature and function of financial
institutions differentiate them from one another. Therefore, based on their
37. For more information regarding the arguments for regulatory competition by
implementing a competitive federalism approach, see Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2366
(1998). See also Damien Geradin & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Co-opetition:
Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate (Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2005–06).
38. This phenomenon is sometimes called regulatory bifurcation. See Erich Schanze,
Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated
Markets, 151 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 162, 162 (1995).
39. CORRIGAN, supra note 36, at 7.
40. See, e.g., Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. BANKING
& FIN. 557, 577 (1984).
41. CORRIGAN, supra note 36, at 1-2; E. GERALD CORRIGAN, ARE BANKS SPECIAL?:
A REVISITATION (2000). However, other scholars do not agree with the “specialness”
argument for banks. See, e.g., ANAT R. ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’
NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013).
42. RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009).
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specialization in certain instruments and strategies, different financial
institutions yield heterogeneous benefits, become subject to idiosyncratic
risks, and pose different risks to the financial system.
Contemporary history of financial regulation is abound with
examples of fragmented regulation. For instance, the U.S. Glass-Steagall
Act separated commercial banking from investment banking and
subjected commercial and investment banks to two different regulatory
regimes and agencies (the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
respectively). The primary rationale behind the Glass-Steagall Act was to
prevent the conflicts of interest and risk taking behavior that typically
resulted from comingling commercial and investment banking activities.
In other words, it was argued that since investment banking is different
from commercial banking in terms of its functions and potential risks,
consolidation of these two activities together in one financial firm can
create severe conflicts of interests.
Likewise, the compartmentalization argument can be offered for
differential regulatory treatment of hedge funds. For this purpose,
differential treatment of hedge funds can best be understood in light of
hedge funds’ specific functions in the overall financial system and their
potential costs and benefits. Hedge funds occupy a relatively sui generis
position in the financial system and provide “special” and idiosyncratic
benefits that other financial institutions, given their nature and function,
are unable to provide.43
Hedge funds provide diversification benefits.44 This means that
investing in hedge funds can improve the risk-return relationship for
investors.45 In addition, during periods of negative equity returns,
investing in hedge funds can decrease the volatility of a portfolio by
offsetting market movements.46 For example, an allocation of ten to
twenty percent of a portfolio to alternative investments, including hedge

43. Needless to say, these sui generis functions are made possible first and foremost
by the special regulatory treatment of hedge funds by the financial regulators.
44. Wouter Van Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk
Perspective, 19 FIN. MKTS., INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 269, 275-78 (2010).
45. Thomas Schneeweis, Vassilios N. Karavas & Georgi Georgiev, Alternative
Investments in the Institutional Portfolio 5 (Ctr. for Int’l. Sec. & Derivatives Mkts.
Working Paper Series, 2002).
46. Id.
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funds, is recommended for pension funds that strive for a long-term
strategy of low risk and low returns.47
Moreover, hedge funds are sources of liquidity.48 This is especially
notable in niche markets and during liquidity crises.49 By investing in submarkets that are “less liquid, more complex and hard-to-value,” such as
convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps, hedge funds
can complete and deepen financial markets.50 In fact, in recent years the
growth and development of some niche markets, such as those for
unsecured and subordinated debt, is attributed to or correlated with the
growth of hedge funds willing to take risks that other traditional financial
institutions, such as banks, are unwilling to take.51
In addition, hedge funds’ aim of generating alpha by outperforming
markets is mostly achieved through exploiting market imperfections and
discrepancies.52 This function of hedge funds is beneficial to financial
markets because it facilitates and accelerates price discovery by eroding
arbitrage opportunities.53 Furthermore, the legal protections for hedge
funds’ proprietary information induce them to invest in the acquisition of
private information on which almost no disclosure requirement is
imposed. This enables hedge funds to discover and exploit mispriced
assets and securities, which, in turn, can result in more efficient markets
by pushing the securities prices to their true or fundamental values.54
Moreover, such proprietary investment in information acquisition can
significantly increase the role of hedge funds in disciplining the
underperforming firms and, in some cases, uncovering fraudulent
47. Id.; see also William F. Sharpe, Asset Allocation: Management Style and
Performance Measurement, 18 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 7 (1992).
48. See Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic
Risk, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 13, 13-15 (2010). See generally Francesco Franzoni & Alberto
Plazzi, Hedge Funds’ Liquidity Provision and Trading Activity (2012).
49. The provision of liquidity by hedge funds in niche markets became mostly
possible because of the differential regulatory treatment applied to them in terms of the
lack of limits on the amount of leverage, investment concentration, short selling, and use
of structured products and derivatives.
50. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, 275-278.
51. Bianchi & Drew, supra note 48, 13-15.
52. In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on hedge funds’ use of financial instruments
and strategies along with their investment concentrations enables them to use a wide
range of techniques to exploit market imperfections.
53. Andrew Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 19, 22 (2007).
54. Roach Jr., supra note 12, at 173.
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activities.55 Therefore, some argue that having larger and greater number
of hedge funds can contribute to the efficiency of markets.56
It is also easier for hedge funds to take contrarian positions in
financial markets. Again, the unlimited use of leverage, short selling,57
limited investor liquidity (i.e., through limited redemption rights or longer
lock-ups), unlimited possibilities to invest in derivatives, and unrestrained
investment concentration potentially enable hedge funds to take positions
that other financial institutions cannot due to the regulatory capital
requirements imposed on the latter. This can smooth and reduce market
volatility and reduce the number and volume of asset price bubbles.58 Not
surprisingly, empirical evidence suggests that the leverage of hedge funds
is countercyclical to that of listed financial intermediaries, meaning that
given the pro-cyclicality of leverage in other financial institutions, hedge
funds’ leverage has an inverse relationship with the leverage of other
major financial market participants.59 In other words, when the leverage
of the mainstream financial institutions increases during a financial boom,
the leverage of hedge funds tends to decrease; in a financial downturn or
credit crunch, the leverage of mainstream financial institutions decreases
while hedge fund leverage tends to increase. This feature, coupled with
the unlimited capability of hedge funds to leverage their contrarian
positions, amplifies the effects of such positions. As a result, the
contrarian position taken by hedge funds can smooth the volatility of
financial markets. Indeed, their contrarian strategies enable them to be
active traders during financial crises. This feature of hedge funds can
55. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism 1093 (Harv., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper
No. 802, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577 [https://pe
rma.cc/PW9Y-VZHC].
56. Crockett, supra note 53, at 22-23.
57. In order to take a short position, the trader usually borrows the securities from a
dealer and sells them to the market with the expectation that the price of the securities
will be lower at a certain point in the future at which the trader will again buy them back
and return them to the dealer. By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between
the higher sale price and the lower purchase price at which he bought them back and
returned them to the dealer.
58. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 275-78.
59. This means that hedge funds can be liquidity providers in times of a liquidity
crunch. See Andrew Ang, Sergiy Gorovyy & Gregory B. van Inwegen, Hedge Fund
Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102 (2011). Their empirical study suggests that, unlike other
financial institutions such as banks, hedge funds’ leverage decreased prior to the start of
the financial crisis. Id.
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potentially form a price floor in distressed markets. Financial institutions,
such as banks, cannot play such a role, especially because of the Basellike capital adequacy requirements which apply to all depositary
institutions.60 Therefore, hedge funds contribute to the stability of
financial markets through liquidity provision and significant risk
diversification.61 More importantly, the composition of hedge funds’
investors and the mechanisms used to lock up capital for longer periods
make it possible for hedge funds to maintain their positions, which are
against the conventional market perceptions and price movements, for
longer periods of time.62 Unlike mutual funds and banks, hedge funds are
not required to provide cash redemption on short notice. The right to
redeem alternative investments is often governed by private contracts
which may impose longer lock-up periods on investors’ capital.63 In
particular, gates and side-pocket arrangements within the purview of
private ordering can provide another tool for hedge funds to restrict
investor exits.64 This freedom from liquidity constraints gives hedge funds
additional tools and techniques to better manage liquidity risks, and
enables them to strive for their long-term goals in their investment
strategies.65
All in all, hedge funds can “contribute substantially to capital
formation, market efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity.”66
Regulatory agencies have also long acknowledged the benefits of hedge

60. Jón Daníelson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 30 (2007).
61. Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks and Return of Banking Activities
Related to Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 85, 88-89 (2007).
62. Crockett, supra note 53, at 22.
63. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 277.
64. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44.
65. In terms of maturity transformation, hedge funds stand in between banks and
mutual funds (with higher maturity transformation) on the one hand, and the pension
funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds on the other hand. Despite
arguments to the contrary, it seems that hedge funds play a limited role in liquidity
transformation. See Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 275-78. However, it is
suggested that recently hedge funds are engaging more and more in liquidity
transformation. Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 573 (2011).
66. Roach Jr., supra note 12, at 173 (quoting Concerning the Regulation of Hedge
Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
(July 25, 2006) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n)).
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funds to the financial system.67 Even after the financial crisis, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions suggested that
hedge funds should be compensated for their intermediary functions and
willingness to take risks that other financial market participants are
unwilling to take.68
The private investor exemptions that require hedge funds to have
limits on the number and qualifications of their investors generally rules
out further regulation on the grounds of investor protection, while such
an argument does not hold for banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companies as their investors and depositors are generally
unsophisticated.
On the other hand, the choice of organizational form (LLP or LLC)
for hedge funds may automatically trigger certain mandatory rules such
as general partners’ (managers’) co-investment in hedge funds and their
potential joint liability.69 These features substantially align managers’
incentives with the interest of the investors and to a large extent eliminate
the need for imposing corporate governance standards on hedge funds that
are required for banks and mutual funds.
Needless to say, sustaining such benefits and addressing potential
risks of hedge funds to financial markets call for their special regulatory
treatment.70 In addition to compartmentalization, two other factors
contribute to the regulatory bifurcation of hedge funds around the globe:
regulatory competition and partial industry regulation.

67. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF INV. MGMT., IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 4-5 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.
pdf [https://perma.cc/4K8N-PPJC].
68. See Bianchi & Drew, supra note 48, at 13-15. From this perspective, the special
regulatory treatment of hedge funds can be considered to be a compensation package for
the benefits they provide, such as contributing to liquidity in illiquid markets, helping the
price discovery mechanism become more efficient, distributing risk, contributing to
financial integration, and aiding in diversification.
69. FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 85-87 (2006).
70. Needless to say, this differentiation requires different regulatory treatment for
different financial institutions. Differentiation breeds tailor-made regulation, and tailormade regulation amplifies differentiation. On the other hand, the special regulatory
privileges (subsidies) offered to banks justified a separate set of regulations for them.
Therefore, differences in function, regulatory framework (such as tax treatments,
subsidies, and deposit insurance), and organization breed more differential regulatory
treatments, which makes financial markets more compartmentalized.
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C. REGULATORY COMPETITION
Prior to the information age and globalization, competition among
regulators to attract more businesses was not as fierce.71 As globalization
intensified, the excess capital in international markets resembled the
scenario of “water run[ning] to find its level”72 with an unprecedented
pace. It is in this context that the race to attract more businesses started
among turf-seeking regulators.
Regulatory competition was further accelerated by technological
advancements such as the internet and increasingly diminished
transaction costs, which in turn reduced transaction processing and
clearing times. In such hyper-connected73 global markets, investors
become an “economic herd”74 capable of instantaneously shifting
business across regulatory borders. This allowed firms to take advantage
of regulatory arbitrage opportunities at an unprecedented pace. In the
United States, competition for businesses occurs among the states, which
may explain why the theory of regulatory competition is so inextricably
intertwined with debates about federalism. Against this background,
regulatory competition emerged as an “economic theory of government
organization.”75
While a unitary or consolidated regulator can more consistently
regulate business activities, competition among regulators creates
exploitable gaps and fractures that can undermine their objectives. In the
regulatory competition literature, the original theory explaining
government output of regulation was predicated on a model that accepts

71. Regulatory competition has a long history, perhaps longer than regulatory
arbitrage. The historian Will Durant reports that in Ancient Athens, to stimulate
commerce and industry, Solon started granting citizenship to skillful foreign businessmen
and their families. See WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE: THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION
(2011). Niall Ferguson demonstrates how unitary government and uniformity led to
stagnation in ancient China, whereas competition between national jurisdictions in
divided Europe contributed to the long-term development and subsequent domination of
Europe. See NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST (2011).
72. See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET (1873).
73. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THAT USED TO
BE US: HOW AMERICA FELL BEHIND IN THE WORLD IT INVENTED AND HOW WE CAN
COME BACK, VOL I (2011).
74. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (2000).
75. See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37.
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regulation as a public good.76 The literature on regulatory competition
suggests that the provision of laws and regulations is similar to the
provision of goods and services by economic firms: governments are
suppliers of regulation just as firms are suppliers of products and services
in the marketplace, and thus, should be disciplined by the same forces.77
Advocates of localism argue that localities and states provide
economic efficiency by generating plurality and extending opportunities
for citizens to move into localities that provide a better allocation of
services and taxes.78 Local jurisdictions are supposed to compete for
scarce economic resources, equivalent to excess capital found in financial
markets. In their quest to attract investment and serve the best interests of
their constituents (or to extend their regulatory turf), local regulators
should offer the best quality of regulation to attract more customers (i.e.,
regulated entities). Charles Tiebout’s seminal work advocated the idea of
“voting with the feet” for citizens who are dissatisfied with the provision
of local public goods in a specific state or locality.79 Under this model, the
local governments within a federal framework that provide the optimal
level of regulation should attract more mobile economic resources.80
Under this theory, a unitary regulator would serve as a monopolist,
and regulatory harmonization would be regarded as anticompetitive
cartelization, which would result in inefficiencies. In contrast, a system
76. The need for regulation arises from market failure. The aim of such regulation
should be correcting market failures and imperfections. Regulation itself has a public
goods feature and in the absence of third party action, it will not be provided or it will be
underprovided. The public goods nature of provision of regulation suggests that the
government having monopoly over “the legitimate use of force within the given territory”
has to take action to provide it. As the public goods nature of regulation suggests, its rise
and the method of its study can be investigated similarly to the other systems of provision
of public goods. As the government has the monopoly on the provision of such public
goods which requires taking certain actions which private parties cannot, it seems very
counterintuitive to speak of the regulatory competition. especially within the unitary
states. See Tyler Cowen, Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy, 8 ECON. &
PHIL. 249, 249 (1992).
77. One of the first systematic studies of provision of public goods is conducted in
the American local government context focusing on the debate about localism vs.
regionalism and the state vs. federal government dichotomy context.
78. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration:
A Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 753
(2000).
79. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416, 416 (1956).
80. Id.
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of multiple decentralized regulatory agencies competing for customers,
i.e., economic firms, is supposed to result in more efficient results, namely
enhanced quality of regulation with competitive prices.81 For example, it
is argued that “the incessant turf battles” among American financial
regulatory authorities are equivalent to competition among private
businesses.82 This disciplines regulators by the threat of loss of their
market share or regulatory clientele to other agencies, thereby promoting
diligence and competence among regulators.83
Advocates of regulatory competition often appeal to arguments in
favor of decentralization.84 Decentralization mitigates information
asymmetries, decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture, and
encourages more experimentation which allows for alternative
solutions.85 It also induces more innovation, and results in differentiated
and customized services adapted to local circumstances and the needs of
the constituency. The decentralized model of provision of public goods
increases economic efficiency by satisfying the differential preferences in
the locally needed public goods.86 Therefore, since the optimal level of
local public goods in different localities is varied, governments can
provide a better allocation of local services in a decentralized structure.87
In the same vein, regulatory arbitrage plays an important role in
delivering the benefits of regulatory competition. In contrast to unitary
regulatory systems or regulatory monopolies in which the demand for
regulation is inelastic, regulatory arbitrage provides alternatives or
regulatory substitutes for regulated firms and thereby makes the demand
for regulation elastic.88 In the harmonized regulatory system, the demand
for regulatory services will be constant, while in the regulatory
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37, at 3.
See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 75.
See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 42, at 65.
See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37, at 2.
Id.
See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990).
87. See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay On Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1120, 1121-22 (1999). Although devolution and decentralization which can encourage
competition are more likely to generate efficient results, just as markets, there are two
conditions for the achievement of goals in such a model of regulatory competition. First,
there should be no externalities. Secondly, markets should be and remain open for free
entry and exit of capital and labor. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European
Business Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 125, 128 (1994).
88. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1362.
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fragmentation model, ceteris paribus, the demand increases with more
harmonization and decreases with more fragmentation. Therefore,
harmonized regulatory jurisdictions will be less accountable and
fragmented jurisdictions will be more accountable to their regulated
firms.
Such a dramatic change in the elasticity of demand means that if
regulators cannot provide good quality regulations at competitive prices,
regulated firms will desert them. Hence, this increased elasticity of
demand engenders more accountability towards their clientele. On the
other hand, this market or “downward accountability”89 will impose
constraints on regulators and can serve as a safeguard against regulatory
capture.90 Since regulators have an incentive to increase, or at least
maintain, their market share of regulated entities,91 competition and the
possibility of regulatory arbitrage will operate as a check on regulatory
despotism by eliminating inefficient regulators.
In addition, enhanced diversity among regulators can be effective in
avoiding conflicts of interest in regulatory functions.92 By the same token,
89. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38, 42
(2000).
90. Findings by Grabosky and Braithwaite show that regulatory agencies that
regulate “(1) smaller numbers of client companies; (2) a single industry rather than
diverse industries; (3) where the same inspectors were in regular contact with the same
client companies; and (4) where the proportion of inspectors with a background in the
regulated industry was high” are more likely to have a cooperative rather than
prosecutorial regulatory practice. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE REGULATION DEBATE 55 (1992). The empirical
findings in that regard confirm the theory that “the evolution of cooperation should occur
only when regulator and firm are in a multi-period prisoner’s dilemma game. Repeated
encounters are required for cooperation to evolve.” Id. When an agency regulates a small
number of firms in a single industry, the likelihood of the repeated encounters is greater,
which can pave the way for cooperation and corruption. Id.
91. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1362.
92. See Cristie L. Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the
Global Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L. J. 257, 257 (2010). Some scholars raise questions
about the regulatory arbitrage argument. For example, Zingales argues that since it is the
managers and not the shareholders who choose regulators, such a regulatory regime can
potentially suffer from agency problems. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities
Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 401 (2009). On the other hand, it is suggested that
regulatory competition may give rise to a “beggar thy neighbor” competitive approach to
regulation and, absent financial regulatory coordination, create regulatory arbitrage
opportunities for the firms inducing a regulatory race to the bottom, which enables
financial institutions to circumvent effective financial regulation. See JAMES R. BARTH,
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in the context of financial markets and hedge fund regulation, regulatory
competition may deter cooperation and corruption between regulators and
regulated firms.
Moreover, regulatory competition provides market benchmarks or
yardsticks against which the oversight of each regulator can be assessed
among different groupings in a regulatory tournament, also known as
“yardstick competition.”93 Such an arrangement for monitoring regulators
is similar to mechanisms long used in labor contracts. In labor contracts,
and especially in franchise agreements, the franchisor (regulator) is not
able, or it is not cost-justified for her, to monitor the level of effort (input)
of the franchisee, whereas the level of output is readily observable. In
such a context, there are several methods to deal with this information
asymmetry problem, such as “cost-of-service” regulation and “lagged
price adjustment” mechanisms.94 However, both mechanisms can be
equally inefficient; in such a setting, yardstick competition can achieve a
more efficient outcome than the alternatives.95
Where competition involves political agents, the tournament can be
adopted in regulatory competition scenarios with the focus on
competition among governments or regulators. Such an application rests
on the assumption that the voters (regulated firms) lack full information
about the quality of the input of politicians (regulators) and that they use

GERARD CAPRIO, JR & ROSS LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS
GOVERN 68 (2006); see also Acharya et al., supra note 11. In addition, there is a tradeoff between regulatory capture and regulatory harmonization. Features of regulatory
competition that induce regulatory arbitrage decrease the likelihood of regulatory
capture. But the regulatory harmonization can decrease the likelihood of regulatory
arbitrage while increasing the likelihood of regulatory capture.
93. Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319–
20 (1985).
94. Id. The equivalent of the “cost-of-service” regulation for regulating regulators is
making their pay dependent on performance (by estimating the costs of performance and
paying them accordingly), while the equivalent of the “lagged price adjustment” is the
deferred compensation schemes for regulators. Id.
95. Id. Recent studies show that incentive-based pay schemes outperform fixed pay
and that tournament theory is less effective than piece rate in certain settings. See
generally M. ALI CHOUDHARY, VASCO J. GABRIEL & NEIL RICKMAN, INDIVIDUAL
INCENTIVES AND WORKERS’ CONTRACTS: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT (2012).
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other politicians’ performance as a yardstick or benchmark to evaluate the
performance of their own politicians.96
There are several studies emphasizing the welfare-enhancing
features of regulatory competition in financial regulation.97 For example,
regulatory competition among accounting standards and the ability to
choose the regulators and corporate structures within and across
international boundaries would improve the efficiency of corporate
governance and accounting standards, and eventually lead to a lower cost
of capital. Thus, competitive accounting regimes are more efficient than
monopolistic ones, even internationally.98 Moreover, within this crossjurisdictional regulatory competition, financial institutions can sidestep
costly and stifling regulations leading to a higher allocative efficiency in
capital markets.99
Despite the benefits of regulatory competition and regulatory
arbitrage, they impose social costs or externalities. Most importantly,
regulatory arbitrage imposes systemic externalities on financial markets.
After the recent global financial crisis, skeptics question whether
regulatory competition leads firms to migrate to poorly-regulated
jurisdictions or whether it curbs a regulatory race to the bottom.100
D. PARTIAL INDUSTRY REGULATION
An additional explanation for differential treatment of homogenous
economic activities is predicated on the partial-industry regulation
(“PIR”) model.101 The PIR model is built on an understanding that the
“government regulates only a part of the industry, leaving another part
unregulated. Under partial-industry regulatory schemes, government
96. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of
Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, 86 GEO.
L.J. 201, 256-58 (1997).
97. For more information regarding the reasons for the regulatory competition by
implementing the competitive federalism approach, see Romano, supra note 37.
98. Shyam Sunder, Regulatory Competition Among Accounting Standards Within
and Across International Boundaries, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2002).
99. Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International
Bank Flows, 67 J. FIN. 1845, 1846 (2012).
100. Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers,
Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719, 719 (2010).
101. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony
Standard for Consumer Protection, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 13 (1992); see also AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 6.
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purposefully treats firms in an industry differently.”102 This regulatory
strategy is a middle path between full-industry regulation and laissez-faire
policies, as it attempts to balance the virtues of both. The proponents of
this approach argue that, in certain industry and regulatory settings,
regulation of an individual firm (or a subset of firms) within a particular
industry can be more efficient because it would avoid the costs of opting
for either sweeping industry-wide intervention or a complete laissez-faire
position.103 In contrast to regulatory competition, which aims to enhance
competition among regulators, PIR tries to stimulate competition within
the regulated industry.104 In other words, the PIR strategies’ goal is to
harness the competitive forces of the market to enhance market
discipline.105 The main advantage of this approach is that it can use
regulated firms to effect a behavioral change in other firms within the
industry.106 In addition, this diversified regulatory approach—which is
sometimes called “regulatory bifurcation”107—can provide additional
advantages such as mitigating the adverse effects of regulatory errors,
furnishing a competitive check on the regulators’ decisions by ensuring
that the unregulated firm enjoys higher degrees of independence from the
regulator, and inducing monitoring mechanisms among regulated
firms.108
In such a scheme, the regulated and unregulated sections of an
industry can check one another’s abuses. Such a regulatory scheme can
eventually harness market accountability or downward accountability.109
Put differently, PIR can be viewed as a form of regulatory delegation or
indirect regulation in which regulated firms can ensure that the
unregulated firm will comply.110 The eventual result of a PIR strategy is
102. Ayres & Brathwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation, supra note 101, at 14-15.
Ayres and Braithwaite also argue that the objections to the PIR based on the concerns
about fairness of treating firms differently, predicated upon the equal protection clause,
are unfounded. Id. at 38.
103. See Ayres & Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation, supra note 101, at 13; see
also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 90, at 6.
104. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE REGULATION DEBATE, 137 (1992).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Schanze, supra note 38.
108. See AYRES & BRATHWAITE, supra note 90, at 137.
109. Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. & SOC’Y 38 (2000).
110. See id. at 142. Ayres and Braithwaite identify three forms of partial industry
regulation: dominant-firm strategies, fringe-firm strategies, and tournament competition
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a “dual governance of individual markets.”111 Therefore, this regulatory
bifurcation eventually creates two distinct playing fields governed by
different rules.112
Dual governance, though beneficial, is not without costs. The main
problem is that such a system of regulation stimulates strategic responses
by the firms to the regulatory fragmentation of the industry. Profitmaximizing firms in such a segmented regulatory system will seek to shift
or restructure their business in order to fall under the least costly
regulatory regime. By creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage,
regulatory bifurcation and regulatory competition can inhibit cooperation
among regulators to effectively address externalities in financial
markets.113 It is argued that absent more coordination between regulators,
such regulatory arbitrage may dilute efforts aimed at limiting excessive
risk-taking in financial markets.114
E. DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS: LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE
An additional major source of regulatory arbitrage lies in the nature
of legal compliance and enforcement. Indeed, the “gap between the
economic substance of a transaction and its legal and regulatory
strategies. See id. Built on tournament theory, yardstick competition derives some
benchmarks from the average industry performance and rewards the firms passing the
benchmarks. See id. For example, in labor contracts and especially in franchise
agreements, the franchisor is not able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the
level of effort of the franchisee; however, she can observe the level of output. Shleifer
suggests that under certain assumptions, the yardstick competition can achieve an
efficient outcome in this setting. See Shleifer, supra note 93, at 319-20. For example, as
a cost-cutting strategy, the franchisor, who franchises the activities to several firms, can
create a yardstick for the costs of the firms based on the average costs of other similar
firms and create a competitive environment by announcing to franchisees that the firms
with less costs than the benchmark can win certain prizes. Therefore, such a tournament
design can create an environment in which the firm’s profits will depend on its ability to
achieve certain output levels with lower costs than its competitors. See AYRES &
BRATHWAITE, supra note 90, at 142. This kind of intervention ties suppliers’ profits to
the performance of their competitors. Id. at 144.
111. Id. at 143.
112. HELEN A. GARTEN, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
(2001).
113. Engert, supra note 16, at 366-67.
114. Acharya et al., supra note 11, at 188; see also Houston et al., supra note 99, at
1848.
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treatment”115 exists because of the “legal system’s intrinsically limited
ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions with
sufficient precision.”116 This breeds opportunities for technical
compliance with the legal rules that undermine the “underlying spirit and
the purpose” on which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is
built.117 Compliance of this sort, dubbed “creative compliance,” is welldocumented in the regulation literature.118 It involves “using the law to
escape legal control without actually violating legal rules.”119 Creative
compliance is made possible by the nature of legal rules, i.e., the “open
texture” of the law. This arises from the limits “inherent in the nature of
language, to the guidance which general language can provide,”120
stemming partly from the “relative ignorance of fact[s]” and “relative
indeterminacy of aims.”121 The type of regulatory arbitrage stemming
from exploitation of gaps and loopholes can often occur within a single
jurisdiction.
The choice of a particular method of interpretation in financial
regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can also significantly affect the
problems facing the financial system. One source of regulatory arbitrage
is associated with “legal formalism.” Legal formalism is usually
understood as following the literal mandates of a rule, even if it ill serves
its purpose. In general, “[f]ormalism implies a narrow approach to legal
control—the use of clearly defined, highly administrable rules, an
emphasis on uniformity, consistency and predictability, on the legal form
of transactions and relationships and on literal interpretation.”122 Such an
approach usually does not recognize “necessity of choice in penumbral
areas of rules.”123
The aim of creative compliance is to avoid legal control by appealing
to formalism in legal interpretation, which is a relatively dominant
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Fleischer, supra note 18, at 229.
See id.
See KAREN YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH (2004).
See id.
D. McBarnet & C. Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the
Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 848 (1991).
120. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1994).
121. Id. It in turn arises from the limited cognitive abilities of human beings because
the knowledge of all possible combinations of contingencies could not be achieved by a
human being. See id. It follows that the rules and regulation devised on this inherently
flawed knowledge cannot escape those limits.
122. McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 119, at 848-49.
123. See HART, supra note 120, at 124-30.
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approach in legal thinking and jurisprudence.124 The emphasis on literal
interpretation highlights the role of definitions in legislation and rule
making. The emphasis on the definitions constitutes a platform from
which many of the intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage opportunities
can potentially be launched. Needless to say, rule-based regulation (as
opposed to principle-based regulation, which focuses on the broad
objective rather than the means) creates vast opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage. As McBarnet argues, “[d]efinitions and criteria involving clear
rules or thresholds make particularly valuable material for legal engineers
to work on.”125
In the context of hedge funds, definitional problems can sterilize
regulatory attempts to address potential systemic risks posed by hedge
funds. In fact, hedge funds define themselves by regulatory exemptions;
this means that they do not have a shape of their own, and should mostly
be viewed in light of the exogenous effects of regulations affecting their
overall shape. This adaptative and dynamic aspect of hedge funds deepens
the gap between their economic functions and regulatory categorizations.
In addition, the responsive strategies of hedge funds to regulation induce
every “otherwise non-hedge fund investment pool” to circumvent the
restrictions of regulation by taking refuge under the hedge fund
definitional umbrella. This move to acquire hedge fund status and make
use of exemptions increases the heterogeneity of the statutorily-defined
hedge funds.126 Consequently, the term hedge fund applies to many
124. See generally, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing
the definition of the word “client”); Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, [1940]
AC 1014 (HL) 1022 (“The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be
given their ordinary meaning.”). Although creative compliance is present in every area
of regulation, it is more likely to be exploited in financial regulation and tax laws. This
is because of the traditionally detailed, specific, and rule-based nature of tax and financial
laws.
125. Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work,
Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 72
(Iain G. MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010).
126. For example, Payne criticizes the Alternative Investment Fund Managers
Directive (AIFMD) for failing to adequately differentiate between hedge funds and
private equity funds in regulating these two different types of alternative investment
funds. See Payne, supra note 65, at 21-22; see also Jacob Rothschild, Europe Is Getting
It Wrong on Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/f
51bdb9a-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/JES2-A8E9] (arguing that the
then proposed AIFMD is so broad in scope that it captures other firms as well, such as
investment trusts in Britain).
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heterogeneous funds with vastly heterogeneous investment strategies that
comply with some black-letter rules of statutes and regulations.
III. ADDRESSING REGULATORY ARBITRAGE: MARKET LIMITS VS.
PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES
Policymakers have expressed doubt over the merits of regulatory
competition and have characterized regulatory arbitrage as a harmful
phenomenon.127 They have also expressed concern over market
fragmentation and localization resulting from inconsistent policy choices
throughout the world (e.g., the U.S. Volcker Rule and the U.K. ring
fencing).128 Purported gaps between global regulatory institutions and the
global nature of finance have instead led to policy recommendations129
favoring harmonization, centralization, and consolidation of regulatory
regimes.130 It is argued that regulatory arbitrage, though beneficial, limits
regulators’ ability to control systemic risk.131 Thus, the common concern
for such proposals is the mitigation of systemic risks posed by hedge
funds.
On the other side of the spectrum, it is suggested that such a move
toward regulatory harmonization is misguided because hedge funds did
not significantly contribute to the financial crisis, nor are they likely to do
so in the near future.132
Instead, regulatory consolidation and global harmonization may
result in heightened systemic risk because in such a regime, regulators
tend to adopt similar strategies and thereby push financial institutions to
127. Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Financial Stability Board and the
Future of International Financial Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE
AND ITS REGULATION, supra note 11, at 64.
128. See id. For more on the concept of ring fencing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, RingFencing, 87 S.CAL. L. REV. 69 (2013).
129. Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding the Global in Global Finance and
Regulation, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION, supra note
11, at 28-29.
130. Regarding hedge fund regulation, see generally Engert, supra note 16
(supporting regulatory cartelization to curb regulatory arbitrage) and Wulf A. Kaal,
Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 389 (2011)
(proposing measures to minimize opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds).
131. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 33.
132. See Roberta Romano, supra note 15. Romano sees the post-crisis regulatory
response to hedge funds in the shadow of the historical hostility towards short-sellers.
See id.
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adopt similar business strategies. Deprived of the benefits of
diversification, such regulatory systems, in which the risks of regulatory
errors can easily be amplified, could be more prone to systemic risk than
a decentralized regulatory regime.133 Regulatory arbitrage can thus be
seen as a buffer against systemic regulatory and market failures.134
More generally, empirical findings confirm the intuition that
regulatory competition among legal systems can enhance the quality of
corporate and securities laws by embracing bottom-up legal innovations
and experimentation.135 Given the benefits of regulatory competition,
increased harmonization is not the best solution, and it might produce
unintended consequences. Instead, the mitigation of potential risks of
regulatory arbitrage requires a shift in focus from regulatory
harmonization to the quality of regulation within each and every
individual regime. Such a balanced approach can deliver the benefits of
regulatory competition, and in the meantime, can limit regulatory
arbitrage of a kind that may result in a race to the bottom.
The rest of this Article studies the ability of market forces in
addressing the potential negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage.
This Article will further elaborate how legal placebo effects, higher
attrition rates among hedge funds, and the opaqueness of the hedge fund
industry prevent markets from addressing potential risks and externalities
of regulatory arbitrage on their own.
A. DO MARKETS LIMIT REGULATORY ARBITRAGE?
The demand for regulatory services is ultimately a function of the
demand by financial institutions’ creditors and investors for safety and
soundness of their counterparties. For example, if investors demand more
protection, firms will try to meet that demand by registering with a wellknown regulator that provides reputation-enhancing regulation. Hedge
funds will similarly demand high quality regulation that offers more
protections for investors. Therefore, there are limits to a race to the bottom
133.
134.
135.

See Nabilou, supra note 13.
Id.
See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005). On the other hand, there is a
third view on the unitary vs. diversified regulatory mechanisms, called “regulatory coopetition.” This view sides with the approach that “optimal governance requires a flexible
mix of competition and cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between
governmental and non-governmental actors.” See Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37.
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arising from regulatory arbitrage, and market forces can, to some extent,
mitigate its effects. The firms’ ability to arbitrage between regulatory
regimes is constrained by their willingness to be subjected to the least
credible regulatory regime. In turn, financial institutions’ willingness to
do so is a function of, among other things, their investors’ and
counterparties’ willingness to engage in transactions with stable financial
institutions within reliably stable and credible financial infrastructure.136
Therefore, if quality of regulation matters for financial institutions
because of reputational concerns, race to the bottom concerns from
regulatory arbitrage will be largely unfounded.
Recent empirical studies on regulatory arbitrage by banks find strong
evidence of fund transfers by banks to less regulated markets. This finding
holds even after controlling for the reverse causality, i.e., the endogenous
regulatory responsiveness to capital market flows.137 In addition, strong
evidence of arbitrage opportunities is documented in the form of banks’
foreign expansion decisions due to the “regulatory gaps in activity
restriction, capital regulation, supervisory independence and strength,
external audit, disclosure transparency, and loan classification.”138
However, these studies suggest that in the absence of strong institutional
infrastructure and legal environment that includes protections for property
and creditor rights, lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise to
massive capital flows from heavily-regulated to lightly-regulated
jurisdictions because “strong regulations . . . may serve as a signal of
quality and stability.”139 Indeed, these findings demonstrate that “crosscountry differences in regulations have a much more pronounced effect
on bank flows if the recipient country has an advanced economy, strong
creditor rights, strong property rights, and a high degree of information
sharing among investors.”140
Therefore, the importance of the quality of regulation and its effect
on regulatory arbitrage mitigates the concerns for a potential race to the
bottom, which is the main concern about regulatory arbitrage. Indeed,
empirical works confirm the theory that regulatory competition separates
countries based on their financial and securities regulatory systems
136.

KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 131
(2006).
137. See generally Houston, Lin & Ma, supra note 99.
138. Id. at 1847.
139. Id. at 1848.
140. Id.
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between jurisdictions catering to opportunistic managers and jurisdictions
attracting managers or issuers seeking to signal credibility and quality.
Investors and companies identify themselves accordingly by registering
with those regulators.141 In turn, a rational investor will discount
investments in poor-quality issuers, offsetting the risk of opportunistic
behavior by managers.142
In addition, a regulatory jurisdiction’s established reputation and
credibility can be translated into financial premiums for financial
institutions regulated by the authorities of that jurisdiction. For example,
banks can build their reputation by registering with a jurisdiction whose
regulatory regime offers a credible deposit insurance scheme or stricter
prudential regulation.143 By the same token, competitive threats to the
U.S. banking system from offshore financial centers in the U.S. dollar
deposit market are limited by reputational considerations.144 Therefore,
the quality of regulation is of crucial importance; reputation-enhancing
regulation is less prone to regulatory arbitrage than anti-competitive
regulation.145
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF MARKET FORCES IN ADDRESSING REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE BY HEDGE FUNDS
Notwithstanding the extensive literature on the impact of reputationenhancing regulation on regulatory arbitrage by banking entities, less
research has been conducted on the importance of reputation-enhancing
regulation on regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. Therefore, it is apt to
ask how much a reputation for being regulated by credible regulators
matters for hedge funds. This Article accepts the proposition that a firm’s
appetite regarding reputational benefits will vary depending on the nature

141. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 950 (1997).
142. Id. They further argue that regulatory competition is a check on the performance
of self-regulatory organizations (such as rating agencies). Regulatory competition in
these areas can provide the investors and market participants with alternatives for poor
regulatory performance. Therefore, such a regulatory design in fact complements private
regulatory mechanisms.
143. ALEXANDER, DHUMALE & EATWELL, supra note 126, at 136.
144. Richard J. Herring & Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in the Global
Economy (1995).
145. ALEXANDER, DHUMALE & EATWELL, supra note 126, at 136.
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of the firm. Consequently, the arguments for regulation as a signal of
quality may matter more to some firms than others.
This section argues that because of legal “placebo effects,” higher
attrition rates in the hedge fund industry, and the inherent opaqueness of
hedge funds, reputational concerns that may arise from regulation are of
less importance for hedge funds compared to mainstream financial
institutions. These relatively lower reputational costs usually fail to
outweigh the economic benefits of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds,
and thus make regulatory arbitrage economically more attractive for
hedge funds than for banks, mutual funds, and pension funds.
1. Legal Placebo Effects and Hedge Fund Reputational Concerns
Introduction of new laws and regulations can change investors’ risk
perception of the regulated activity or entity. In other words, laws have
placebo effects, which “manipulate[] individuals’ expectations regarding
a risk that the law addresses.”146 Such an effect alters the welfare of
regulated individuals and firms separate from the effects arising from the
actual enforcement of the law.147 Legal placebo effects can cause a
convergence or divergence of the individuals’ perception of the
probability and magnitude of risks with regard to the objective risk.
“Positive placebo effect” of a law entails the mitigation of an
overestimated risk by individuals as they perceive the legislation as a risk
mitigating factor.148 In other words, in some cases the law’s effect is to
reduce the level of perceived risks in individuals who overestimate the
risks had no legislation been passed.
The law’s effect on the risk perception of individuals and institutions
will vary based on their level of sophistication. Put differently, legal
placebo effects are of asymmetric nature for different categories of
investors. Therefore, positive placebo effects of laws (the ones which
reduce the overestimated perception of risk)149 depend on the level of
sophistication of regulated entities. For institutional, accredited, and
146. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating
Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 57 (2006).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 60-61 (describing positive placebo effect, negative placebo effect,
positive anti-placebo effect and negative anti-placebo effect of law). For the implications
of the placebo effect theory for the allocation of regulatory resources, see Amitai Aviram,
Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 739 (2012).
149. Aviram, supra note 146, at 57.
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qualified investors, such an effect is less than that for unsophisticated
investors whose perception of risk is more prone to cognitive biases.
Based on this analysis, positive placebo effects of laws have
disproportionate effects on hedge funds and banks. This is mostly due to
the fact that the investor base, counterparties, and creditors of hedge funds
are more sophisticated than those of banks, mutual funds, and pension
funds.150
Therefore, compared to hedge funds, the reputational effects of being
subject to regulation by a credible regulator are amplified for banks whose
clients are unsophisticated investors and do not have adequate resources
at their disposal to assess the true risks of these institutions. This implies
that there is a heightened incentive for mainstream financial institutions
such as banks, mutual funds, and pension funds, which deal with
unsophisticated investors on a daily basis, to signal to their investors and
depositors about their safety and soundness by registering with credible
regulators. However, there are no such amplified incentives for hedge
funds because such a registration with a credible regulator cannot
dramatically manipulate the risk perception of hedge funds’ sophisticated
investors, creditors, and counterparties. This means that regulationinduced reputation matters less for hedge funds, and hence they can
relatively easily engage in regulatory arbitrage.
2. Attrition Rate in the Hedge Fund Industry and Reputational Concerns
Repeated interactions are seen as a prerequisite for the emergence of
evolutionary cooperation based on reputation. On the other hand, limited
future interactions breed opportunistic behavior. Hedge funds display an
extraordinarily high level of attrition compared to mainstream financial
institutions such as banks, mutual funds, and pension funds.151 Because of
150. In some European countries such as Luxembourg and Germany, hedge funds can
be marketed to non-profesional investors. However, these jurisdictions are exceptions to
the rule, which requires that investors in a hedge funds should be sophisticated. See
Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs.
Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183, 185-235 (2015)
151. See Michael R. King & Philip Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability:
Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 286
(2009) (“One estimate suggests hedge fund attrition rates ranged between 3.8% and 5.1%
per year between 1999 and 2007 (ISFL, 2008). Other studies use the number of funds
that stop reporting to the Lipper TASS database. According to this proxy, the average life
span of a hedge fund is 40 months, with a median life of 31 months. Fewer than 15% of
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high attrition rates among hedge funds, they have relatively shorter time
horizons and one-dimensional relationships with their counterparties and
regulators. Such limited future interactions mitigate the effects of
reputational concerns and market discipline, and increase the likelihood
of their opportunistic behavior.
There is a widespread concern in the literature on corporate
governance with regard to hedge fund short-termism.152 Short-termism
occurs in inter-temporal choices. These choices are usually made by
“decisions in which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over
time.”153 The dispersion of costs and benefits over time accompanied by
the conflicts of interest of the principals and agents in an economic firm
highlight the importance of the short- and long-term horizons, which
might result in compromising greater long-term benefits for fewer shortterm benefits.154 Even in the absence of conflicts of interest, managers or
economic agents might be prone to myopia, making it difficult for them

hedge funds last longer than 6 years, while 60% disappear with 3 years. . . . Directional
hedge funds have the highest attrition rates, followed by multi-strategy funds. According
to Hedge Fund Research, 2005 was a record year for hedge fund liquidations, with nearly
850 hedge funds closing down. By comparison, 563 hedge funds closed in 2007, with
another 350 hedge funds closing over the first 6 months of 2008. At this pace, the total
closures for 2008 will represent around 7% of the industry. A number of the highest
profile victims of the credit crisis have been hedge funds owned or managed by regulated
LCFIs, such as two Bear Stearns hedge funds ($1.6 billion) and Dillon Read Capital
Management ($3.5 billion). The proprietary trading desks at LCFIs have also reported
large losses, with Morgan Stanley’s loss of $7.8 billion providing one example among
many. Lastly, Cole et al. (2007) point out that these frequent failures of hedge funds have
not resulted in a financial crisis.”); see also Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann &
Roger G. Ibbotson, Offshore Hedge Funds: Survival and Performance, 1989–95, 72 J.
BUS. 91, 92 (1999); Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return,
61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 80, 80 (2005).
152. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, et al., The
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015)
(suggesting that claims that hedge fund activism adversely impacts firms are not
empirically tenable).
153. George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3
J. ECON. PERSP. 181, 181 (1989).
154. GREGORY JACKSON & ANASTASIA PETRAKI, UNDERSTANDING SHORT-TERMISM:
THE ROLE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, http://www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Texta
rchiv/WIP2/Praesentationen/jackson-petraki_short-termism.pdf [https://perma.cc/6276FKET].
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to accurately weigh the long-term consequences of their decisions.155
Increased hedge fund activism, though beneficial for corporate
governance and performance of firms,156 gave rise to concerns about
hedge funds’ short-termism with regard to the corporate governance of
the firms they acquire.157 Though a concrete and fully-entrenched case for
hedge fund short-termism is yet to be made,158 concerns have been raised
about the harms that hedge funds might cause while pursuing their own
self-interest.159
The high attrition rate among hedge funds can contribute to a
tendency to be short-sighted and hence create incentives for opportunistic
behavior in hedge funds as they approach the end-game, a stage in
repeated interactions that undermines the reputational effects. Hence, due
to this higher attrition rate, hedge funds will not be as strongly subject to
market discipline as their counterparties and creditors. Commercial and
investment banks, mutual funds, and other financial institutions with
lower attrition rate often have multi-dimensional financial relationships
with other market participants and regulators. This long-term relationship
often creates much stronger reputational effects for these institutions,
reducing their incentives to behave opportunistically and misuse the
standard market conventions to their advantage. On the contrary:
155. Id. (citing David Marginson & Laurie McAulay, Exploring the Debate on Shorttermism: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 273 (2008)).
156. See Stefano Gatti & Chiara Battistini, Hedge Funds’ Activism: A New Trend of
Convergence Toward Private Equity in Public Firms?, in PRIVATE EQUITY: FUND TYPES,
RISKS AND RETURNS, AND REGULATION 183 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010) (“Empirical
evidence has clearly shown that post hedge funds’ intervention firm performance is better
than before the activists’ action. Positive market reactions are also associated with
interventions on CEO compensation and turnover and to subsequent changes in the
dividend distribution policy. Overall, this definitely confirms a positive role played by
hedge funds in the interest of all the other shareholders of the firm.”); Alon Brav et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729
(2008).
157. For the role of hedge funds in corporate governance, see Thomas W. Briggs,
Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J.
CORP. L. 681 (2007).
158. Indeed, studies suggest that the concerns about hedge fund short termism in
unfounded. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015).
159. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007). Kahan and Rock conclude that the
“[s]hort-termism thus presents the potentially most important, most controversial, most
ambiguous, and most complex problem associated with hedge fund activism.” Id. at 1087.
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hedge funds typically have a single-product business with the sole
focus of maximising returns from trading in financial markets, and as
such are subject to fewer constraints than other institutions. Hedge
funds are also able to have more concentrated portfolios than other
institutions, so that for a given portfolio size, they are able to obtain
larger positions in individual markets, and to change those positions
more quickly. The result is that they can be completely opportunistic
when it suits them.160

Higher attrition rates among hedge funds and their shorter time horizons
undermine the importance of reputation for hedge funds. Therefore, it
seems that regulation-induced reputational concerns in the decision to
engage in regulatory arbitrage are of less importance to hedge funds than
to well-established and reputation-sensitive financial institutions such as
banks and mutual funds.
3. Transparency and Reputational Concerns in the Hedge Fund Industry
Reputation matters more in transparent markets than in opaque ones.
Information disclosure can enhance or damage the reputation of firms in
transparent markets faster than it does in opaque markets. Therefore,
transparency enhances the importance of reputation, and the importance
of regulation-induced reputational costs decreases the likelihood of
regulatory arbitrage to less-reputable jurisdictions. However, due to lower
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds (because of the
absence of mandatory disclosure to markets), it is less costly for hedge
funds to engage in regulatory arbitrage compared to other mainstream
financial institutions, which are subject to mandatory disclosure.
It has been well established how information asymmetry can result
in market failure.161 The transparency deficit and asymmetric information
are especially problematic in financial markets because of the nature of
financial products and the inter-temporal nature of financial transactions.
Financial services are generally viewed as “credence goods,” the quality
of which is not ascertainable even after their purchase and use.162 In
160. RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., HEDGE FUNDS, FINANCIAL STABILITY, AND MARKET
INTEGRITY 5 (1999).
161. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
162. Alessio M. Pacces & Heremans Dirk, Regulation of Banking and Financial
Markets, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL 2, at 9-10 (Alessio M. Pacces
& R. J. Van den Bergh eds., 2011).
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credence goods, which have the highest level of information asymmetry,
mandatory information disclosure requirements can significantly mitigate
the likelihood of market failure. In addition, the importance of trust and
reputation in inter-temporal financial transactions usually exacerbates the
negative effects of information asymmetries. For example, banks are less
willing to lend for longer periods of time and depositors are less willing
to deposit their money in a financial institution from which they cannot
withdraw on short notice (i.e., longer lock-ups).163 Since the level of
lending will be far lower than its socially optimal level in this setting,
transparency and information disclosure can help mitigate information
asymmetry and help reduce funding costs of financial institutions. Being
a well-known, reputable, and trustworthy borrower is essential for
attracting, concentrating, and channeling investors’ scattered savings into
economically productive activities.164
Market benefits of information disclosure include enhanced
liquidity, lower cost of capital, and better firm valuation.165 In the absence
of a reliable information disclosure system in financial markets, the
uninformed investors cannot tell the “lemons” from the “peaches.”
Therefore, to hedge against possible losses as a result of trading with
informed investors, market participants will discount the purchase price
of the stock and inflate its selling price, reflecting the probability of
trading with an informed counterparty multiplied by the potential
information surplus of the counterparty.166 This increased bid-ask spread
will decrease liquidity for a particular stock.167 As Akerlof predicts, such

163. By the same token, short-term demandable deposits are considered a source of
market discipline that curtail excessive risk-taking by banks. See C. W. Calomiris & C.
M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements,
AM. ECON. REV. 497, 497 (1991).
164. This in turn translates into the maturity transformation function at the heart of
financial intermediation.
165. Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 97 (2001)
(arguing that corporate disclosure can mitigate the adverse selection problem and
increase market liquidity by leveling the playing field among investors); see C. Leuz &
P. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation:
A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105398 [https://perma.cc/GX6Y5D2Y].
166. Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165.
167. See Verrecchia, supra note 165; Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165.
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an instance of asymmetric information may lead to the collapse of the
entire market for that product.168
Even in unregulated markets, high-performing firms have disclosure
incentives to signal their quality and distinguish themselves from poorly
performing firms.169 However, the main reason for market failure in
providing the optimal level of information is the problem of externalities.
Despite being socially optimal, information disclosure might not be
privately optimal for a specific firm.170 Similar to the problem of
commons or the “impure public goods” nature of information, this
problem exists due to the externalities arising from non-excludability of
information when it is out at large in the market.171 In the context of
information disclosure, such externalities drive a wedge between
privately and socially optimal levels of disclosure.172 As an example,
Admati and Pfleiderer show that in a model of voluntary disclosure by
firms in financial markets, externalities arise when firm values are
correlated.173 In such a setting, the costly disclosure of one firm can be
used in the valuation of other firms, and hence can generate a free-rider
problem.174 Such disclosure can help the competitors of a disclosing firm
while hurting the issuer.175 In this case, the amount of disclosure is often
suboptimal and regulation can improve social welfare.176 In addition,
Fishman and Hagerty argue that mandatory disclosure is necessary in
markets in which the information about the product is relatively difficult
to understand.177 As mentioned above, since financial products and
services are credence goods, this argument can be readily applied to
financial services.
On the other hand, trust in inter-temporal transactions can be
considered a public good, and leaving it to the forces of markets can result
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Akerlof, supra note 161, at 490.
Id.
See Leuz & Wysocki, supra note 165.
ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 34 (2004).
Id.
Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479 (2010).
174. Id. at 512.
175. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345 (1999).
176. Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 173, at 482.
177. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
45 (2003).
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in its under-provision. The trust deficit in financial markets calls for
government intervention, as do other sectors of the economy.178 Aghion
et al. demonstrate that in a cross-section of countries, the lack of trust
breeds higher levels of government intervention even though the
corruption in government itself is a public knowledge.179 Among financial
institutions, hedge funds and hedge fund products have an established
reputation for complexity and opaqueness. Such opaqueness intensifies
the trust deficit and amplifies information asymmetry in hedge fund
products. Therefore, notwithstanding the theories arguing that voluntary
disclosure itself is a separating equilibrium,180 such a signaling
mechanism by firms might become too costly because of the externalities
involved in the voluntary disclosure setting. The proprietary nature of
hedge funds’ information exacerbates this problem and hinders more
information disclosure.
There are additional reasons for hedge funds’ non-disclosure, which
can convolute the signaling effect of disclosure and further dissuade
hedge funds from voluntary disclosure. Some hedge funds might be
saturated with investors’ money and cannot take on additional
investments. Accordingly, they may stop disclosing information. Other
hedge funds might not disclose information because of the regulatory
limits on the number of their investors. In addition, the prohibition on
public solicitation by hedge funds further decreases their incentives to
disclose information. Since disclosure, to a certain extent, might be
considered public solicitation, it may trigger the automatic application of
otherwise dormant rules to hedge funds. Therefore, not only do hedge
funds have no incentive to disclose, but certain statutory provisions also
prohibit or discourage them from doing so, thereby refuting the optimality
of voluntary disclosure in the context of hedge fund regulation. Moreover,
under the voluntary disclosure mechanism, there is a likelihood that some
hedge funds might disclose information opportunistically (i.e., by
disclosing less valuable information) or they may cherry pick the
information to be disclosed. Since all these factors will discourage the

178. After all, this was the same reason for most of the bank runs and systemic risks
in the history of finance.
179. Philippe Aghion et al., Regulation and Distrust, 125 Q. J. ECON. 1015 (2010).
180. The argument is that even in the absence of mandatory disclosure, outperforming
firms will disclose and underperforming firms will not, hence disclosure itself will be a
separating equilibrium that will distinguish highly-performing firms from poorly
performing ones.
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disclosure of information, it will lose its signaling effect. Therefore,
disclosing firms will not be rewarded with more money from investors.
To summarize the argument, the main market mechanism that can
inhibit regulatory arbitrage is the reputational effect arising from the
regulatory infrastructure, such as regulation offering adequate protections
for property rights, creditor rights, and reliable disclosure mechanisms.
Indeed, reputation, which is induced by regulation, is a compensation for
the costs of regulation for regulated firms and will keep regulated firms
where they are, instead of encouraging them to migrate to other
jurisdictions. However, in the absence of mandatory disclosure systems
for hedge funds, no regulatory scheme and jurisdiction can be credible
enough to justify its costs and hence cannot inhibit a race to the bottom.
Therefore, the firms registered in those jurisdictions will not enjoy a
premium because the regulation cannot sufficiently enhance reputational
benefits. A regulatory regime that generates no reputational benefit for
the regulated industry to compensate the costs of regulation is especially
prone to regulatory arbitrage. Since the lack of transparency lowers the
reputational costs of regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds, hedge funds
will be more likely to engage in regulatory arbitrage than their mainstream
counterparts.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES TO REGULATORY ARBITRAGE BY
HEDGE FUNDS
To address the problems associated with regulatory arbitrage, several
proposals have been put forward. These proposals range from equivalence
requirements,181 strengthening regulatory coordination,182 cooperation,
regulatory co-opetition,183 and regulatory harmonization, to regulatory
181. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial
and Tax Law Equivalence Requirements, in RECONCEPTUALISING GLOBAL FINANCE AND
ITS REGULATION, supra note 11, at 391 (arguing that equivalence requirements are likely
to result in heightened competitiveness in the financial sector and in the meantime prevent
regulatory arbitrage by requiring convergence of objectives and allowing diversity in
details).
182. Van Eechoud et al., supra note 44, at 309; see also James Chapman, Stéphane
Lavoie & Lawrence Schembri, Emerging from the Shadows: Market-Based Financing in
Canada, FIN. SYS. REV., June 2011, at 29, 37 (arguing for “a coordinated global response
. . . to establish clear principles for the monitoring, assessment and regulation of [the
shadow banking sectors] that . . . limits unintended consequences and opportunities for
cross-country regulatory arbitrage”).
183. Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37.
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consolidation,184 and unification,185 perhaps leading to the creation of a
World Financial Organization akin to the World Trade Organization186 or
a Global Economic Council for overseeing the stability of the
international financial system.187 Although regulatory globalization can
address cross-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage, it will fall short of
addressing intra-jurisdictional regulatory arbitrage arising from
definitional problems.188 Based on the idiosyncratic features of the hedge
fund industry, this Article proposes an approach that can mitigate the
negative externalities of regulatory arbitrage regardless of whether the
arbitrage opportunity is intra-jurisdictional or inter-jurisdictional.
Given the benefits of regulatory competition, which presupposes
some degree of regulatory arbitrage, the optimal amount of regulatory
arbitrage is not zero. The aim is to maximize the benefits of regulatory
arbitrage, while minimizing its externalities. As discussed earlier in the
debate about regulatory competition, regulatory arbitrage facilitates the
formation of a meta-market for legal and regulatory regimes within which
it is possible to trade governance under one regime for another. In such a
market, regulation itself is a commodity, and hedge funds will shop for
the regulatory regime that most benefits them. They will buy into the
system when they are satisfied that the marginal cost of the regime equals
or is less than the corresponding marginal benefit. Therefore, while the
initial intention of regulation is to monitor markets, regulatory arbitrage
provides opportunities for firms to themselves regulate and affect
behavioral changes in regulators. It follows that addressing the problems
of regulatory arbitrage does not necessarily call for its total elimination,
for it would be neither possible nor optimal.
To address regulatory arbitrage, special attention should be paid to
incentives-related effects of regulation, i.e., a regulation that imposes
184. See, e.g., RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
185. Geradin & McCahery, supra note 37.
186. See Barry Eichengreen, Not a New Bretton Woods but a New Bretton Woods
Process, in WHAT G20 LEADERS MUST DO TO STABILISE OUR ECONOMY AND FIX THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin eds, 2008); see also Baxter,
supra note 129, at 29.
187. Timothy Adams & Arrigo Sadun, Global Economic Council Should Oversee All,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/f253db24-8a8b-11de-ad08-001
44feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/4WQU-UJNE].
188. For a discussion of definitional problems affecting the regulation of hedge funds,
see Nabilou, supra note 13.
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additional costs on the regulated industry should offset those costs by
offering the industry benefits of being subject to a specific regulator.
Ceteris paribus, the regulatory system in which the marginal benefits of
regulation equal its marginal costs will be arbitrage-proof.189 Therefore,
the design of a financial regulatory regime should result in an equilibrium
from which hedge funds have no incentive to deviate without making
themselves worse off.
The immediate conceivable benefit of regulation is the reputational
benefit that registering with certain regulators can create for financial
institutions. However, such reputational benefits will not be sufficient to
hinder hedge funds from regulatory arbitrage, as the benefits are not
sufficient to off-set the costs of regulation, thereby inducing hedge funds
to arbitrage between different regimes. Thus, the regulation should be
designed to not only provide benefits, but also impose as minimal a cost
as possible on hedge funds.
Following the underlying efficiency criterion and incentive
compatibility of hedge fund regulation, regulators should provide the
sector negatively affected by regulation with incentives to stay within the
limits of its rules. One of the examples of such an exclusive advantage
offered for regulated entities is illustrated in the banking industry.190
Traditionally, the banking sector is heavily-regulated. To off-set the
burden of such heavy regulations, regulators have granted the banks
monopolies on certain financial transactions by offering them valuable
bank charters.191 This protects the banking industry from outside
competition, hence giving it sufficient countervailing benefits (subsidies)
vis-à-vis the costs of heavier regulation.192
189. This is conditional upon the comparative benefits of regulation; this does not
necessarily mean that such a regulatory system should adhere to the least restrictive
regulation to prevent a race to the bottom.
190. See Rebecca S. Demsetz, Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, Banks with
Something to Lose: The Disciplinary Role of Franchise Value, 2 ECON. POL’Y REV. 1
(1996).
191. See id.
192. The effect of such a monopoly was that prior to the emergence of the nonbank
financial institutions, bank loans did not have appropriate substitutes; therefore, the
demand for bank loans was fairly inelastic. See Sean Becketti & Charles Morris, Are
Bank Loans Still Special?, 77 ECON. REV. 71, 71 (1992). The inelasticity of demand for
bank loans was because of the charter value of the banks that limited the entry into the
banking industry. The philosophy behind creating charter value for banks was to keep
them within the banking regulatory scheme, which was more burdensome for banks than
for similar financial institutions.
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The history of banking shows that the advent of the shadow banking
sector and the accompanying loss of bank charter value posed a major
challenge to banks. For example, a decrease in bank charter value induced
more risk-taking behavior by banks.193 Prior to the loss of charter value,
the charter by itself was considered a valuable asset for banks and losing
the charter in the event of insolvency was one of the factors that
incentivized banks to take less risk.194 However, with decreasing charter
value, this incentive was diluted and banks began to take more risks.195
A more recent example of such off-setting benefits can be found in
the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (“AIFMD”). This
Directive introduces the passport mechanism for hedge funds, which
enables them to market their products throughout the European Union
(“EU”) after registration with an EU Member State.196 Introduction of
such a mechanism is best understood as an off-setting mechanism for
heavier regulation of hedge funds under the AIFMD with the aim of
preventing European hedge funds from relocating to other looselyregulated jurisdictions.197 However, it remains to be seen how effective
this strategy will be in preventing regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds or
even in attracting new hedge funds to Europe. To be sure, such benefits
will be measured against regulatory costs which are imposed on hedge
funds by such strict regulations. It seems that it is only by creating a
competitive edge or providing subsidies to firms that regulators can
discourage regulatory arbitrage. Otherwise, the competitive pressure from
the lightly-regulated financial institutions will generate positional
externalities198 and will incentivize more and more financial institutions
to shift their business to such jurisdictions.

193.
194.
195.

See Demsetz et al., supra note 190.
See id.
Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. BANKING & FIN.
557 (1984).
196. Directive 2011/61 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, art. 32(1),
2011 O.J. (L 174) 40.
197. See Hossein Nabilou, A Tale of Regulatory Divergence: Contrasting
Transatlantic Policy Responses to the Alleged Role of Alternative Investment Funds in
Financial Instability, 12 CAP. MKT. L. J. 94 (2017).
198. For the concept of positional externalities, see Robert H. Frank, Positional
Externalities Cause Large and Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137,
137-41 (2005).
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This Article argues that the indirect regulation of hedge funds
through banking entities, which are already heavily regulated, will impose
the lowest possible cost on the hedge fund industry. This is especially
important to curtail regulatory arbitrage. As already suggested, a
regulatory framework that only imposes costs without offering
countervailing benefits is prone to regularly arbitrage. Indirect regulation
of hedge funds through banks will make it redundant for regulators to
devise regulations, which would create additional countervailing benefits
for the hedge fund industry to create an equilibrium from which hedge
funds do not have any incentives to deviate. The main rationale for
shifting the focus from hedge funds to banks for the purpose of regulating
hedge funds is that the banking entities are already heavily subsidized; the
cost of indirect regulation of hedge funds by banking entities would be
off-set by the already existing subsidies within the banking industry.
One of the controversial debates fueled by the recent crisis was the
debate on whether to regulate hedge funds directly or indirectly.199 On the
one hand, U.S. and U.K. regulators and the hedge fund industry itself
supported the indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulated banks.
On the other hand, the EU supported a direct regulatory framework for
hedge funds. This divergence of opinion was deepened by the events of
the global financial crisis, including accusations of hedge funds’ abusive
short-selling practices. In the end, the clash of the two opposing views
resulted in a compromise. It seems that one of the factors giving rise to
such a compromise was an increasingly stringent attitude in the U.S.
toward hedge fund regulation after the change of administration.200 This
change of policy paved the way for the realization of European views on
hedge fund regulation. The efforts to rein in hedge funds culminated in
the G20 London Summit in April 2009, in which all parties agreed that
hedge funds and their advisers should be subject to mandatory registration
and disclosure requirements.201 Nevertheless, this Article argues that
indirect regulation can better address the problems of regulatory arbitrage
by hedge funds.
The commands of law directed at creating behavioral changes in its
subjects can be applied directly or indirectly. Direct or entity regulation

199. For the definition of direct and indirect regulation of hedge funds, see Nabilou
& Pacces, supra note 150.
200. For more details, see Eilis Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge
Funds and Private Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 390 (2011).
201. Id.
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includes “regulatory measures focusing on the regulation of the industry
itself (as a discrete activity or as part of the broader, regulated investment
services universe).”202 Thus, direct regulation implies that regulation is
directed at the hedge fund entity itself or at the activities directly or
immediately conducted by the funds. In contrast, indirect regulation is a
type of regulation the imperatives or commands of which are mediated by
or transmitted through an intermediary to the primarily intended regulated
entity or activity. Indeed, in indirect regulation of hedge funds, regulators
directly regulate financial institutions that provide financial services to
hedge funds or their counterparties.203 This involves “market disciplineinspired regulatory measures targeting the creditors and counterparties of
hedge funds (mainly, but not exclusively, their prime brokers and
securities brokers).”204 Therefore, a key element in the indirect approach
is the regulator’s reliance on market participants, namely to reward wellmanaged firms and to punish poorly-managed ones.205
There are several reasons why direct regulation of hedge funds
cannot effectively address potential hedge fund externalities.206 The
regulatory arbitrage-generating effect of direct regulation is one of the
repeatedly-pronounced arguments against direct regulation.207 Indeed,
202. PHOEBUS ATHANASSIOU, HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 227 (Joseph J. Norton et al. eds., 2009).
203. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 34 (2012),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YT46-GWNA].
204. Athanassiou, supra note 202, at 227. Athanassiou adds that:

The aim of such measures would be to enhance the counterparty risk
management practices that financial institutions apply in their
dealings with hedge funds and/or to impose disclosure duties on prime
brokers and other crucial hedge fund counterparties in respect of their
hedge fund exposures. An indirect approach could be complemented
by the obligatory ‘registration’ of managers of hedge funds in
conjunction with the (voluntary) improvement, by the hedge fund
industry itself, of its transparency, risk management and asset
valuations standards and practices.
Id.
205. Roger T. Cole et al., Hedge Funds, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Stability,
10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 7, 11 (Apr. 2007).
206. Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 150, at 192-96 (2015).
207. For example, Kaal argues that not only will direct regulation induce relocation
of hedge funds, but it also will result in their restructuring. WULF ALEXANDER KAAL,
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one of the primary concerns discouraging targeted regulation of hedge
funds is that not only will the imposition of such regulation result in
competitive disadvantages for the jurisdiction imposing the rule, but that
it will also lead to the offshore relocation of hedge funds. This is largely
because hedge funds, similar to other corporate entities, have an exit
option and will “vote with their feet.”208 This relocation has adverse
consequences for regulators and the jurisdiction involved. It can deprive
the rule-imposing jurisdiction of tax revenues generated from hedge funds
as well as of the job opportunities created by them. Indeed, the fear of
hedge fund relocation was one of the factors that played a role in the
regulatory forbearance in imposing stricter rules on the funds prior to the
financial crisis.209
Therefore, since regulation cannot offer substantial reputational
benefits (subsidies) for hedge funds, those benefits are unlikely to off-set
the costs of direct regulation. In order to effectively address the potential
systemic risks of hedge funds while minimizing the opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage, the funds should be indirectly regulated through their
prime brokers, executing brokers, investment managers and advisers, and

HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS (2005). For instance, Garbaravicius supports the idea that indirect regulation
can be more effective than direct regulation in regulating hedge funds because it can
avoid the problem of regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. See TOMAS GARBARAVICIUS
& FRANK DIERICK, HEDGE FUNDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY
49 (2005). Daníelsson and Zigrand argue that “there always remains some risk that
localized regulation causes hedge fund advisors to relocate to more favorable
jurisdictions, removing regulatory oversight further” and making it counterproductive.
See Jon Danielsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY
REV. 29, 30 (2007).
208. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
416 (1956). On the other hand, Hirschman explains how such a rapid exit can exacerbate
the deterioration of a firm because “those customers who care most about the quality of
the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most active, reliable, and
creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who are apparently likely to
exit first in case of deterioration.” Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). As a result, “the
rapid exit of the highly quality-conscious customers—a situation which paralyzes voice
by depriving it of its principal agents—is tied to the availability of better-quality
substitutes at higher prices.” See id.; see also Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition
and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 331, 337 (2000).
209. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Regulation via Basel, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
389, 391, 400, 438 (2011).
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subject to certain regulatory qualifications on their investors and
investments.210
In addition, because of the value of the proprietary information, it
seems implausible to suggest the imposition of mandatory disclosure as a
means of direct regulation. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure involves
externalities, which can inhibit hedge funds from optimally sourcing the
information. Thus, indirect regulation of hedge funds can better address
these problems, as banks and prime brokers are already subject to
mandatory disclosure requirements.
Delegation of hedge fund regulation to the counterparties of hedge
funds not only decreases the chances of regulatory capture, but also
increases efficiency by providing incentives to regulators to compete with
each other. Furthermore, since indirect regulation of hedge funds will be
implemented by multiple prime brokers, it provides for the possibility of
decentralized enforcement of the rules that are initially applied to the
banking sector.
It might be argued that such an indirect regulation will impose
additional restrictions on hedge funds’ counterparties and thereby cause
certain regulatory arbitrage opportunities for hedge funds’ prime brokers
and other counterparties. However, banks—the only depository
institutions—are much more sensitive to reputational considerations than
hedge funds, especially when it comes to enhancing their reputation by
registering with a regulator that provides strong and credible deposit
insurance. Accordingly, the costs of regulatory arbitrage for banks are
more significant than those for hedge funds. Also, given the relatively
more harmonized international regulatory framework for banks,211 which
are the main counterparties of hedge funds, regulatory arbitrage by banks
would be of less systemic significance than regulatory arbitrage by hedge
funds.
CONCLUSION
The interplay and dynamics of financial regulation and hedge funds’
responses to such regulation can culminate in regulatory arbitrage in the
global financial markets. This Article argues that the differential
regulation of homogenous financial activities giving rise to regulatory
210. J. S. AIKMAN, WHEN PRIME BROKERS FAIL: THE UNHEEDED RISK
FUNDS, BANKS, AND THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY (2010).
211. Such as the provisions of Basel I, II, and III.
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fragmentation is the main source of regulatory arbitrage. However, the
differential regulatory treatment should not be considered a necessary
evil; instead, it may often yield more efficient outcomes than its
alternatives (i.e., consolidated regulatory regimes) do in certain market
settings. This Article focuses on regulatory competition as a driving force
for differential regulatory treatment of homogenous financial activities,
which can result in fragmented regulatory schemes and a dual system of
governance.
There are market limits to regulatory arbitrage. For example,
empirical studies suggest that regulatory arbitrage is limited by
reputational effects. Legal infrastructure, which signals quality, plays an
important role in the relocation decisions of financial firms preventing a
race to the bottom. Nevertheless, such an argument cannot plausibly be
applied to hedge funds. The level of sophistication in the investor base of
the hedge fund industry inhibits legal placebo effects that could otherwise
amplify the impact of regulation-enhanced reputation. Furthermore,
hedge funds’ high attrition rate and limited transparency can also diminish
the reputational and credibility costs for hedge funds. Such indiscernible
reputational costs facilitate hedge fund regulatory arbitrage and do not
disincentivize hedge funds from engaging in regulatory arbitrage.
Therefore, this Article suggests that to reduce the likelihood of regulatory
arbitrage, instead of regulating hedge funds directly, the strategy should
focus on regulating hedge funds indirectly through their counterparties,
creditors, and investors for whom reputational costs are significantly
higher. The theoretical framework and recommendations put forward in
this Article can easily lend themselves to empirical tests, especially in an
era in which hedge funds are coming out of the shadows due to the
information disclosure obligations imposed on them by the post-crisis
financial reforms on both sides of the Atlantic.

